Biofuels and the global food balance by unknown
Table 1—Biofuel Production as Energy-Equivalent Shares of Total Gasoline and Diesel Demand for Transportation 
in the Aggressive Biofuel Growth Scenario (percent)
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Rising world fuel prices, the growing demand for energy, and  concerns about global warming are the key factors driving the 
increasing interest in renewable energy sources, and in biofuels in 
particular. But some policymakers and analysts have voiced concern that 
aggressive growth in biofuel production could “crowd out” production of 
food crops in some developing countries, creating a tension between the 
need for energy and the need for food and feed.
This brief investigates the interaction between crop demand for 
biofuel feedstock and the demand and production of crops for both food 
and feed, in order to see how scenarios for projected growth in biofuel 
production could affect food availability, prices, and consumption at 
global and regional levels between now and 2020. 
BIOFUEL SCENARIOS
The model used for this analysis is the International Model for Policy 
Analysis of Agricultural Commodities and Trade (IMPACT), which the 
International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) has used to project 
global food supply, food demand, and food security to the year 2020 and 
beyond. The model contains three categories of commodity demand: 
food, feed, and other use demand. This study manipulates the “other use” 
demand category in order to reﬂect the use of commodities as biofuel 
feedstocks, depending on the projected level of biofuel production. The 
commodities in question are maize, sugarcane, sugar beet, wheat, and 
cassava for bioethanol, and soybean and oilseed crops for biodiesel. Given 
that cellulosic feedstock sources such as crop residues and switchgrass 
are not represented, their effect is modeled by reducing the demand on 
the food commodities that are represented within IMPACT. A limitation of 
this approach is that it does not allow for substitution among different 
feedstocks in the production of biofuels, which when combined with the 
absence of trade in biofuel products, can cause the feedstock costs of 
biofuel production to vary enormously by country in the model solutions. 
Although this assumption about trade may be realistic in the short term, 
it would have to be relaxed for longer-term projections to allow for pos-
sible expansion in future biofuel trade.
Drawing on projections for biofuel demand for the relevant 
countries and regions, IMPACT models three scenarios in addition to 
the normal baseline, which contains no extra “other demand” usage for 
biofuel feedstock beyond that used in the base year 1997. These scenarios 
are as follows:
1. Aggressive biofuel growth scenario with no productivity 
change. This scenario assumes very rapid growth in demand for 
bioethanol across all regions and for biodiesel in Europe, together 
with continued high oil prices, and rapid breakthroughs in biofuel 
technology to support expansion of supply to meet the demand 
growth, but holds projected productivity increases for yields at 
baseline projection levels. The “aggressive biofuel growth” scenario 
replaces 10 percent of gasoline production with biofuels by 2010, 
15 percent by 2015, and 20 percent by 2020 throughout most of 
the world, except for adjustments in line with other projections 
for Brazil, the European Union, and the United States. The biodie-
sel projections focus solely on the European Union 15 (EU-15) 
countries because they account for almost 90 percent of global 
production volume. Projections for all regions other than the Euro-
pean Union focus solely on bioethanol. For bioethanol production, 
maize, sugarcane, sugar beet, cassava, and wheat are considered 
feedstock crops. Table 1 shows the shares of biofuels in the context 
of total road transport fuel use, and these ﬁgures reﬂect the fact 
that although the scenario assumes displacement of either gasoline 
or diesel fuel in each country or region, many countries and regions 
use both types of fuel.
2. Cellulosic biofuel scenario. In this scenario, second-generation 
cellulosic conversion technologies come on line for large-scale 
production by 2015. In this case, the volume of biofuel feedstock 
demand is held constant starting in 2015, in order to represent the 
relaxation in the demand for food-based feedstock crops created 
by the rise of the new technologies that convert nonfood crop 
residues, grasses, and forest products. Crop productivity changes 
are still held to baseline levels.
3. Aggressive biofuel growth scenario with productivity change 
and cellulosic conversion. This scenario now considers, in addi-
tion to second-generation technologies, the effect of investments 
in crop technology that would lead to increased productivity over 
time, in order to better support the expansion of feedstock supply 
in response to growth in biofuel demand. These productivity im-
provements are parallel to those used in other IMPACT-based stud-
ies to show the beneﬁts of sound agricultural investment policies 
in developing agricultural economies, and they emphasize strong 
agricultural productivity growth in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Year China India Brazil United States European Union Rest of world
2005 2 1 37 2 1 0
2010 4 5 47 3 4 2
2015 6 8 49 3 7 2
2020 8 11 58 4 10 2
Source: Authors’ calculations based on 2005 actual production and energy demands from the Worldwatch Institute and the International Energy Agency (IEA). 
Brazil and U.S. projections based on IEA bioenergy and U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) sources, respectively. 
Note: Higher shares in Brazil have signiﬁcant exports of ethanol production embedded in them. The projection for the European Union is based on a potential 
path dominated by biodiesel, while other regions only represented displacement by bioethanol. 
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RESULTS
The “aggressive biofuel growth” scenario shows dramatic increases in 
world prices for feedstock crops (Table 2). If cassava were to be used 
aggressively as a feedstock for bioethanol, cassava prices would rise 
tremendously, causing sizable welfare losses to the major consumers of 
this crop, who reside mostly in Sub-Saharan Africa. There would also be 
high economic costs. If cassava is not proﬁtable as a biofuel feedstock 
at today’s oil prices, it certainly would not be at more than double the 
cassava price. Thus, this scenario would entail subsidies for the biofuel 
sector, which already exist for many countries (such as within the Euro-
pean Union), and could take the form of tax concessions at the pump 
or producer credits. The high price increases for oils and cassava suggest 
that the relatively low-yielding oil and root crops will have to make up 
fairly high shares of total production in order to meet the oil-displace-
ment trends embedded in the “aggressive biofuel growth” scenario. 
In contrast, the second scenario, which includes the impact of cellu-
losic technologies, shows a considerable softening of these effects, espe-
cially for cassava and oil crops, and underlines the potential importance 
of such technical innovations at the industry level. Improvements in 
conversion efﬁciency for non-cellulosic processes are not introduced into 
the model, since these technologies have been in use for some time and 
show little room for improvement, based on studies cited in the literature. 
The third scenario illustrates the importance of crop technology 
innovation at the farm production level and shows a further softening 
of price impacts, with cassava undergoing the largest decrease. This third 
scenario in particular shows how investments in the biofuel industry and 
the agricultural sector can be combined to produce a more favorable 
outcome, which can mitigate the consumer-level impacts. Moreover, this 
scenario seems the most plausible of the three, as neither national gov-
ernments nor fuel producers would want to engage in a large-scale ex-
pansion of production without the necessary investments being in place 
to ensure a reliable supply of feedstock material at a reasonable cost, 
both for producers and for consumers of food and feed commodities.
Although the mechanisms by which feedstocks might be substituted 
in and out of biofuel production according to their competitiveness with 
long-term fossil-fuel prices and each other have not been modeled, an 
illustrative set of results (for a “ﬁxed” menu of inputs) argues strongly 
for preparatory investments in both the agricultural sector and the fuel 
industry itself.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The results show a “food-versus-fuel” trade-off in cases where innova-
tions and technology investments are largely absent and where trade 
and subsidy policies are failing. In view of past agricultural policy, such 
a scenario cannot be ruled out, unfortunately, but it could certainly be 
avoided. This bleak picture changes considerably when biofuel and crop 
production technology advancements are taken into account. Although 
there is some uncertainty about the timing of eventual large-scale use of 
cellulosic conversion technologies for biofuel production, the potential 
beneﬁts are well recognized in the literature, making a strong case for 
further research in that area. The strong price increases for root crops like 
cassava in the ﬁrst aggressive scenario suggest that without the neces-
sary productivity improvements, aggressive growth in biofuels could have 
adverse effects on well-being in regions like Sub-Saharan Africa, where a 
large proportion of cassava consumption is for food. The third scenario, 
which gives an added boost to agricultural productivity growth in Africa, 
demonstrates this clearly. 
The results suggest that the cost of biofuels could be considerably 
higher than the projected price of oil, so there would need to be compel-
ling nonprice factors for its uptake at the aggressive levels assumed in 
ﬁrst scenario in particular. Indeed, there may be factors favoring the 
decision to adopt biofuel production that cannot be captured within a 
strict quantitative comparison of biofuel versus fossil-fuel costs, such 
as national energy security or positive externalities to the environment. 
Nonetheless, if developing economies are to participate beneﬁcially in the 
growth of renewable bioenergy production and still maintain adequate 
levels of food security, then a complementary set of investments would 
need to be made along the lines suggested. By making such investments, 
these countries are likely to produce beneﬁts for consumers of both food 
and energy, while also contributing to the broader growth of their econo-
mies and the betterment of human well-being.  ?
For further reading see L. Fulton, T. Howes, and J. Hardy, Biofuels for 
Transport:  An International Perspective (Paris: International Energy 
Agency [IEA], 2004); International Energy Agency (IEA), Bioenergy, 
http://www.ieabioenergy.com; IEA, World Energy Outlook, http://www.
worldenergyoutlook.org/; and Worldwatch Biofuels Project, http://www.
worldwatch.org/taxonomy/term/62#1.
Table 2—Percentage Changes in World Prices of Feedstock Crops under Three Scenarios, Compared with Baseline
Scenario 1:  Aggressive biofuel 




Scenario 3:  Aggressive biofuel 
growth with productivity change 
and cellulosic conversion 
2010 2020 2020 2020
Cassava 33 135 89 54
Maize 20 41 29 23
Oilseeds 26 76 45 43
Sugar beet 7 25 14 10
Sugarcane 26 66 49 43
Wheat 11 30 21 16
Source: IFPRI IMPACT projections. 
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